In March 1936, the leadership of the Soviet Air Force, in a memo addressed to People's Commissar Voroshilov, proposed adding the "4-engine Boeing" to the list of aircraft they intended to acquire from the United States. Air Force Chief of Staff Lavrov highlighted its critical attributes, stating: "This aircraft combines the data we urgently need—high speed and long range." Plans were already underway at SUAI to produce the "Flying Fortress" domestically at the newly established Plant No. 124 in Kazan, intending to replicate the complex machine independently without a license.
However, in April of the same year, at a UVVS meeting, Ya.I. Alksnis suggested acquiring technical assistance from the U.S. for producing the Boeing 4-engine bomber. Negotiations with Boeing, facilitated by Amtorg, began but ultimately failed.
In the summer of 1941, following Germany's invasion of the USSR, the United States offered military assistance. President Roosevelt pledged heavy bombers to Stalin, proposing that 10 would be supplied monthly, with five coming from the U.S. and five from the UK. By June 1942, the U.S. planned to deliver 27 aircraft, primarily B-17s, as production of the B-24 had just begun.
Opinions within the Soviet Union about the B-17's value varied. The General Staff's Intelligence Directorate labeled it an "obsolete type of 4-engine bomber," advocating instead for the newer B-24. Conversely, the General Directorate of the Air Force argued that the B-17 was the most suitable bomber for their needs. This view prevailed, and a team led by M.M. Gromov traveled to the U.S. to receive the first batch of five B-17s. They were to quickly familiarize themselves with the aircraft, fly them to England, bomb German targets, and then land near Moscow.
However, the U.S. ultimately declined to deliver the B-17s, offering B-25s, B-26s, and A-29s instead. General Arnold of the U.S. Army Air Force cited a shortage of heavy bombers in American service—only 40 B-17s and one B-24 were operational as of August 1941. Concerns over the transfer of sensitive technology, including advanced bomber sights, further stalled the deal.
Despite these setbacks, Soviet efforts to secure the B-17 persisted. At a meeting of the Tripartite Commission in Moscow on September 29, 1941, Shakhurin asked U.S. Army Air Force General Chanei whether Boeing aircraft could be supplied. Chanei’s response was a firm "not yet," effectively shelving the matter. A final attempt was made in 1944 when the USSR requested 240 B-17s under the IV Military Assistance Protocol, but none were delivered.